NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

THRASYMACHUS B1: DISCORD, NOT DIPLOMACY

Recently in this journal Stephen White proposed a new interpretation of Thrasymachus B1.[1] Preserved by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Dem.* 3), this quotation forms the longest and most significant passage of the sophist's own words to come down to us. Previous commentators have viewed it as a contribution to a debate περὶ πολιτείας in Athens around the end of the fifth century, whence the informal title περὶ πολιτείας in the scholarly literature. As a non-Athenian, Thrasymachus would have been forbidden from addressing the Athenian assembly in a domestic debate, a fact that gives rise to three possibilities: Thrasymachus wrote the speech in the manner of a λογογράφος for an Athenian citizen to deliver to the assembly; it was composed as a model in the manner of Antiphon's *Tetralogies;* or it was composed as a political pamphlet in the manner of Isocrates' *Areopagiticus.*[2] In either of the latter two cases, the speech may never have been delivered at all. White rejects the first two alternatives and (without considering the third) proposes instead a completely different scenario: speaking as an official ambassador from his native Chalcedon, Thrasymachus delivered the speech before the Athenian assembly, probably in the summer of 407, to plead with the Athenian demos for leniency and a grant of autonomy in the wake of the Chalcedonians' unsuccessful defection from the Athenian empire (pp. 315–18). In my view, White's interpretation of Thrasymachus B1 is untenable and the previous interpretations, while standing on much firmer ground, need modification. This note aims to refute White's interpretation of this important and puzzling passage and to clarify what can safely be inferred from and about it.[3]

1. "Thrasymachus the Diplomat," *CP* 90 (1995): 307–27. B1 is the reference in H. Diels and W. Kranz, eds., *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*[6], vol. 2 (Berlin, 1952), 321–24 (chapter 85).

2. Composed for delivery by an Athenian: F. Blass, *Die attische Beredsamkeit*[2], vol. 1: *Von Gorgias bis zu Lysias* (Leipzig, 1887), 250; W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. 3: *The Fifth-Century Enlightenment* (Cambridge, 1969), 295–96; M. Ostwald, *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law* (Berkeley, 1986), 367. Though λογογράφοι wrote mainly for the courts, Antiphon is known to have assisted other Athenians in their speeches to the assembly (Thuc. 8.68.1); Lysias may have done so too (Lys. 34). Model speech: Diels-Kranz, *Vorsokratiker*, 2.322; F. Jacoby, *Atthis* (Oxford, 1949), p. 386, n. 55. Political pamphlet: E. Drerup, "Die Anfänge der rhetorischen Kunstprosa," *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie,* Suppl. 27 (1902): 219–351 at 227; W. Schmid, *Geschichte der Griechischen Literatur,* Part 1, vol. 3.1 (Munich, 1940), 186; M. H. Hansen, "Two Notes on Demosthenes' Symbouleutic Speeches," *C&M* 35 (1984): 57–70 at 67; J. de Romilly, *The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens,* tr. J. Lloyd (Oxford, 1992), 223–24. K. Oppenheimer, "Thrasymachos," *RE* VI A.1 (1936): 584–92 at 587–88 and A. Fuks, *The Ancestral Constitution* (London, 1953), 102–6 summarize the evidence.

3. White considers several matters beyond Thrasymachus B1: Plato's view of Thrasymachus in *Republic I* (pp. 321–24), the well attested diplomacy of Gorgias, Prodicus, and Hippias (p. 314), and several obscure passages in the ancient doxography of Thrasymachus (pp. 318–21). But the crux of White's presentation of Thrasymachus the diplomat and the only issue under discussion here is the new interpretation of B1; this is the only evidence in which White claims to find actual diplomacy. Notwithstanding the present argument, it

For ease of reference I reprint the passage as it appears in White's article (p. 309):[4]

[1a] ἐβουλόμην μέν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, μετασχεῖν ἐκείνου τοῦ χρόνου τοῦ παλαιοῦ καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἡνίκα σιωπᾶν ἀπέχρη τοῖς νεωτέροις, τῶν τε πραγμάτων οὐκ ἀναγκαζόντων ἀγορεύειν καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ὀρθῶς τὴν πόλιν ἐπιτροπευόντων· [1b] ἐπειδὴ δ' εἰς τοιοῦτον ἡμᾶς ἀνέθετο χρόνον ὁ δαίμων ὥστε ⟨vac. ca. 20 litt.⟩ τῆς πόλεως ἀκούειν, τὰς δὲ συμφορὰς ⟨vac. ca. 15 litt.⟩ αὐτούς, καὶ τούτων τὰ μέγιστα μὴ θεῶν ἔργα εἶναι μηδὲ τῆς τύχης ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐπιμεληθέντων, ἀνάγκη δὲ λέγειν· [2] ἢ γὰρ ἀναίσθητος ἢ καρτερώτατός ἐστιν ὅστις ἐξαμαρτάνειν ἑαυτὸν ἔτι παρέξει τοῖς βουλομένοις καὶ τῆς ἑτέρων ἐπιβουλῆς τε καὶ κακίας αὐτὸς ὑποσχήσει τὰς αἰτίας. [3] ἅλις γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ παρελθὼν χρόνος καὶ ἀντὶ μὲν εἰρήνης ἐν πολέμῳ γενέσθαι καὶ κινδύνῳ, εἰς τόνδε τὸν χρόνον τὴν μὲν παρελθοῦσαν ἡμέραν ἀγαπῶσι, τὴν δ' ἐπιοῦσαν δεδιόσιν, ἀντὶ δ' ὁμονοίας εἰς ἔχθραν καὶ ταραχὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀφικέσθαι. [4] καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὑβρίζειν τε ποιεῖ καὶ στασιάζειν, ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐσωφρονοῦμεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς κακοῖς ἐμάνημεν, ἃ τοὺς ἄλλους σωφρονίζειν εἴωθεν. [5] τί δῆτα μέλλοι τις ἂν ⟨ἃ⟩ γιγνώσκει εἰπεῖν, ὅτῳ γε λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς παροῦσι καὶ νομίζειν ἔχειν τι τοιοῦτον ὡς μηδὲν ἔτι τοιοῦτον ἔσται;

[6] πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοὺς διαφερομένους πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ τῶν ῥητόρων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀποδείξω γε παρὰ λόγον πεπονθότας πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὅπερ ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἄνευ γνώμης φιλονικοῦντας πάσχειν· [7] οἰόμενοι γὰρ ἐναντία λέγειν ἀλλήλοις οὐκ αἰσθάνονται τὰ αὐτὰ πράττοντες οὐδὲ τὸν τῶν ἑτέρων λόγον ἐν τῷ σφετέρῳ λόγῳ ἐνόντα. [8] σκέψασθε γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἃ ζητοῦσιν ἑκάτεροι. [9] πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πάτριος πολιτεία ταραχὴν αὐτοῖς παρέχει ῥάστη γνωσθῆναι καὶ κοινοτάτη τοῖς πολίταις οὖσα πᾶσιν. [10] ὁπόσα μὲν οὖν ἐπέκεινα τῆς ἡμετέρας γνώμης ἐστίν, ἀκούειν ἀνάγκη λόγων τῶν παλαιοτέρων, ὁπόσα δ' αὐτοὶ ἐπεῖδον οἱ πρεσβύτεροι, ταῦτα δὲ παρὰ τῶν εἰδότων πυνθάνεσθαι.

Dionysius, whose interest in the passage is purely stylistic, transmits the text virtually without context; aside from naming Thrasymachus as the author, he says only that the passage is ἐξ ἑνὸς τῶν δημηγορικῶν λόγων. Apart from the single ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι in the initial sentence, the text contains no references to specific people, places, or events.[5] As a result, there is a genuine dearth of evidence for answering the most basic questions: Was the passage part of a full speech? If so, was the speech ever delivered? And if it was delivered, by whom, under what circumstances, and for what purpose? Any headway that can be made toward answering such questions must come from the language and argument of the text itself. It is precisely on this basis that White's interpretation can be ruled out. As previous commentators implicitly recognized and as I will set out in detail below, the speaker of the passage addresses an audience of fellow citizens in a citizen assembly (actually in the case of a real speech, hypothetically in a model, or fictionally in a pamphlet); hence speaker and audience are members of the same polis. The issue at stake is domestic discord, which in the speaker's view can be overcome, as he intends to show. This rhetorical situation is incompatible with the diplomatic scenario proposed by White, in which the speaker represents one polis (Chalcedon) while

addressing the citizens of a second polis (Athens), and the issue of contention is whether the audience will bestow on the speaker and his polis back home a grant of autonomy.

The speaker opens by justifying his temerity in addressing the audience (§§1–5). First, he admits a degree of reticence; though admirable in a younger man reluctant to infringe on the prerogatives of his elders, the reticence was ultimately, and properly, overcome, since the politicians in charge have botched matters (§§1ab). This argument makes no sense as a justification for addressing another polis on an official diplomatic mission: there is no basis for pleading reticence when the speaker has been duly appointed by the authorities in his home polis and, having been recognized as the official spokesman of that polis, has already received permission to speak on its behalf before he mounts the βῆμα in Athens. But it would be particularly inappropriate that a foreign ambassador pleading for the welfare of his polis should adopt the pose of youthful inexperience. The situation demands all the authority of experienced wisdom that the speaker could muster; and his ability to project such authority would be one reason why the Chalcedonians would choose him for such a mission.[6] On the other hand, it is well attested in Athens for relatively inexperienced politicians to justify their entry into domestic debate with just the sort of reasoning manifest in the passage at hand. The politician's actual age is not, of course, the issue, but an unfamiliar and untried politician attempting to challenge established rivals needs a reasonable excuse for demanding the attention of the demos and redirecting the prevailing course of debate.[7]

Secondly, the speaker also justifies his entry into the debate by referring to the troubles of his polis: it faces war rather than peace and experiences internal discord rather than concord (§3); and it has practically lost its senses in the midst of bad times (§4). The fault for this state of affairs is said to lie with the politicians who have been in charge (τῶν ἐπιμεληθέντων, §1b).[8] These politicians having failed at their job, the speaker claims that he has an idea that can ameliorate the bad state of affairs; that is the very reason why he is justified in addressing the audience at this time (§§1ab, 5). This argument, virtually a staple of Demosthenes' deliberative prooemia, is an implicit appeal for the audience's strict attention; it makes rhetorical sense only if those being addressed are the ones who can directly benefit from the

6. D. J. Mosley, *Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece*, Historia Einzelschriften 22 (Wiesbaden, 1973), 46. For an example of an ambassador stressing his authority, cf. Xenophon's representation of Callias in Sparta in 371 (*Hell.* 6.3.4).

7. Cf. Dem. 4.1, *Prooemia* 1, 12 (13), 35 (36) (for the text and numeration of the Demosthenic *Prooemia*, see the Budé edition of R. Clavaud, *Démosthène: Prologues* [Paris, 1974]); Ar. *Eccl.* 151–53, *Eq.* 1300–1301; Lys. 16.20–21. Isoc. 6.1–2, displaying a young Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, before the Spartan assembly, uses the same reasoning for the same purpose. The background to the speaker's claim of youthful reticence in B1—"that ancient time" when "it was sufficient for younger men to remain silent" and "older men ran the polis properly" (§1a)—was part of Athenian civic ideology; recall Aeschines' idealizing reminiscence of orderly, competent debate in the hands of the older citizens (3.2). The tension between old and young politicians addressing the assembly is evident in Thuc. 6.12.2, 17.1 (Nicias and Alcibiades) and 6.38.5–39.3 (Athenagoras in the Syracusan assembly, rife with discord).

8. The participle of the verb ἐπιμελεῖσθαι bears no technical meaning here; for similar usage to refer to politicians whom the demos has backed, cf. Xen. *Mem.* 2.8.4, Dem. *Prooemia* 40.3 (41.3). Cf. also the noun ἐπιμέλεια at Thuc. 2.40.2 with comments ad loc. by J. S. Rusten, ed., *The Peloponnesian War: Book II* (Cambridge, 1989), 154. This usage must be distinguished from that of ἐπιμελητής, which as White makes evident at p. 316, n. 29, frequently referred to officers duly appointed to specific civic tasks.

speaker's idea, hence if they are the ones who suffer from the bad state of affairs that the idea can ameliorate.[9] Thus the troubled polis described in §§1–5 is that of both the speaker and the audience, which indicates, necessarily, a domestic debate.[10]

On the other hand, a prooemium of this kind would make no sense in White's diplomatic scenario. First of all, the Athenian demos would hardly be well-disposed toward the envoy of a polis that had defected to Sparta during a harrowing period of war (after the Sicilian disaster of 413) and had then been forcibly subdued in a costly siege; recall the Athenians' sharp anger toward the Mytilenians after their unsuccessful revolt in a less precarious time (Thuc. 3.36–50). Thus, if the ambassador wants to ask the Athenian demos for lenient treatment, he dare not allege that they should attend to his speech just because he has an idea that can solve the problems of his own polis back home! A prooemium to a diplomatic speech such as White envisages would have to strike a different, more practical note. Consider the diplomatic principle with which Thucydides has the Corcyrean ambassadors to Athens in 433 open their request for favorable treatment (Thuc. 1.32.1): "Athenians, when a people that have not rendered any important service or support to their neighbors in times past, for which they might claim to be repaid, appear before them as we now appear before you to solicit their assistance, they may fairly be required to satisfy certain preliminary conditions. They should show, first, that it is expedient, or at least not harmful, to grant their request; next, that they will retain a lasting sense of the kindness. But if they cannot clearly establish any of these points, they must not be annoyed if they meet with a rebuff."[11] Corcyra was effectively neutral when they approached the Athenians in 433, but Chalcedon's position vis-à-vis Athens in 407 was positively unfavorable: they had harmed the Athenian cause by their defection and resistance. This plight would have made it all the more necessary for a Chalcedonian ambassador to portray his request for leniency as a matter of advantage to Athens, and to delay announcing that argument beyond the prooemium would be self-defeating.[12]

Thus, while the rhetorical situation evident in the text effectively rules out the diplomatic scenario proposed by White, it is certainly compatible with a domestic debate περὶ πολιτείας. This compatibility becomes a probability when in the second paragraph the speaker launches his argument on the internal discord that he claims to be able to ameliorate. Here is the real novelty of the entire passage: though the politicians believe they are contending over substance, which is the occasion of the

9. Cf. Dem. *Prooemia* 1, 3 (3–4), 4–7 (5–8), 11 (12), 14 (15), 19 (20), 22 (23), 27 (28), 30–32 (31–33), 37 (38), 43 (44), 46 (47), 48–49 (49–50).

10. At p. 312, n. 19, White discusses the first person plural pronouns in §§3–4, which he correctly says need not, considered in themselves, refer to the speaker and the audience. But of course considered in themselves they may refer to both speaker and audience, and the rhetorical argument of the passage indicates that they do so refer.

11. Translation slightly adapted from Crawley. δίκαιον, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς μήτε εὐεργεσίας μεγάλης μήτε ξυμμαχίας προυφειλομένης ἥκοντας παρὰ τοὺς πέλας ἐπικουρίας, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς νῦν, δεησομένους ἀναδιδά-ξαι πρῶτον, μάλιστα μὲν ὡς καὶ ξύμφορα δέονται, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅτι γε οὐκ ἐπιζήμια, ἔπειτα δὲ ὡς καὶ τὴν χάριν βέ-βαιον ἕξουσιν· εἰ δὲ τούτων μηδὲν σαφὲς καταστήσουσι, μὴ ὀργίζεσθαι ἢν ἀτυχῶσιν.

12. A similar stress on advantage accruing to the audience's polis is evident in the following diplomatic speeches: Spartan ambassadors at Athens in 425 (Thuc. 4.17); Theban ambassadors at Athens in 395 (Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.8–15); the Spartan Dercylidas at Abydus in the late 390s (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.4); Athenian ambassadors at Sparta in 371 (Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.4–17); Procles of Phlius at Athens in 369 (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.2–11).

discord, they are in fact being contentious without reason and unwittingly in agree-
ment, as the speaker intends to show (§§6–7). This part of the speaker's argument,
if it ever existed, followed the end of Dionysius' quotation.[13] Yet one feature of the
argument is clearly hinted at in §§8–9: "Consider from the beginning what each
side is seeking: first, the ancestral constitution (ἡ πάτριος πολιτεία) is causing them
[the contentious politicians] trouble although it is easiest to understand and is that
which is held most in common among all the citizens." Since the phrase πάτριος
πολιτεία and closely related notions are well attested in the literature pertaining to
the domestic political conflicts of late fifth-century Athens, previous commentators
placed Thrasymachus B1 in that general context.[14] White rejects this connection,
arguing that "Athenian proponents of an 'ancestral constitution' in 411 and the fol-
lowing years actually sought to *exclude* thousands from citizen-rights. Whether or
not they deserve to be called 'moderates,' as many have argued, they could hardly
recommend their goal, as B1 does, as 'shared most by *all* citizens' (κοινοτάτη τοῖς
πολίταις πᾶσιν). Their oligarchic aims, in short, are explicitly contradicted by B1,
which presents an *inclusive* government as the fundamental goal on which *all* sides
agree" (p. 313, original emphasis). But this objection is based on a misunderstand-
ing of what πάτριος πολιτεία means and what Thrasymachus says.

Notice first that Thrasymachus nowhere says or implies anything about "inclu-
sive government," a notion that is utterly foreign to the text. What Thrasymachus
does present as "the fundamental goal on which all sides agree" is merely πάτριος
πολιτεία. Now it is true that Cleitophon, one of the so-called oligarchical moderates
around Theramenes, promoted the ancestral constitution (πάτριοι νόμοι) in 411 in
his rider to the decree of Pythodorus that accompanied the rise of the Four Hundred
(Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 29.3); and the Theramenes-group, including Cleitophon, is also re-
ported to have urged the ancestral constitution (πάτριος πολιτεία) after the surrender
to the Spartans in 404 (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 34.3).[15] But this does not mean that ancestral
constitution was simply code for an oligarchy, moderate or otherwise, which would
have excluded thousands of citizens, and that ancestral constitution was understood
to conflict with the universal commonality promised in §9. On the contrary, πάτριος
πολιτεία was not the sole property of oligarchs and was never identified with any
particular constitutional arrangement. Rather, it was a contested notion and was
advocated by virtually all parties to the political conflicts of the late fifth century in
order to dress up their diverse goals in a universally acceptable, even desirable,
form.

For instance, in 411 the democratic faction on Samos countered the Four Hun-
dred in Athens by claiming that the latter had dissolved the πάτριοι νόμοι (Thuc.

13. Extrapolating from the brief extant text and comparing remarks of other sophists, E. A. Havelock,
The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics (London, 1957), 230–39 contrived for this part of B1 "a serious in-
tellectual position, a rationale of political behaviour and method, if not a theory of politics" (p. 234) that he
ascribed to Thrasymachus; cf. now Romilly, *Great Sophists,* 179–80.

14. In the texts under discussion, the terms πάτριος πολιτεία and πάτριοι νόμοι are synonymous; see
M. I. Finley, *The Ancestral Constitution,* Inaugural Lecture (Cambridge, 1971), 7–9 (reprinted in M. I. Fin-
ley, *The Use and Abuse of History* [London, 1975], 34–59, this passage 37–38). See also S. A. Cecchin,
πάτριος πολιτεία: *un tentativo propagandistico durante le guerra del peloponneso* (Turin, 1969). On previous
commentators, see n. 2 above.

15. Finley, *Ancestral Constitution,* 6 conjectures a personal connection between Cleitophon and Thrasy-
machus on the basis of these passages and their joint appearance in Pl. *Resp.* 1.340AB.

8.76.6); and in 403 the decree of Teisamenus inaugurating the restored democracy proclaimed that the Athenians should "conduct their polis in the ancestral manner (πολιτεύεσθαι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια)" (Andoc. 1.83).[16] Ancestral constitution had broad appeal amidst great internal conflict because it was devoid of specific details, was capable of being understood by different groups in vastly different ways, yet evoked the emotional attachments of patriotism and reverence for the past that were in fact common among Athenians. Thus at the moment of surrender to the Spartans in 404 all three major political groupings, the democrats, the moderate oligarchs, and the pro-Spartan radical oligarchs, could claim to seek the ancestral constitution even though they each favored vastly different constitutional arrangements.[17] πάτριος πολιτεία was the perfect phrase if Thrasymachus wanted to point to that which both gave rise to dispute (ταραχὴν παρέχει) and yet might offer a basis for consensus (κοινοτάτη πᾶσιν). The real sophism in the passage is "easiest to understand" (ῥᾴστη γνωσθῆναι); beyond its propaganda value, πάτριος πολιτεία is hardly capable of being understood in any determinate sense at all.[18]

In one more respect the language of the passage suggests the same Athenian context. Thrasymachus speaks of ὁμόνοια as the desirable opposite of the civic strife that beleaguers the polis (§3). Not only is ὁμόνοια well attested in a general political sense as the opposite of stasis (Lys. 2.63, 18.17, Isoc. 18.44, 68), but the word was also used to refer specifically to the resolution of the political conflicts of late fifth-century Athens. For instance, as the regime of the Four Hundred was faltering and popular resistance culminating, the warring factions agreed to hold an assembly περὶ ὁμονοίας as a step toward calming tensions (Thuc. 8.93.3); and ὁμόνοια became virtually a standard locution for the reconciliation effected after the civil war of 404/403.[19] Although Thrasymachus' use of πάτριος πολιτεία and ὁμόνοια does not establish a specific date or occasion for the passage, it does provide firm, important evidence—and the only available evidence—to conjecture what the original context of the passage may have been, a context that is entirely compatible with the rhetorical presuppositions of the passage described above. Compare the leap of faith that would be entailed by the diplomatic scenario proposed by White (even though it has already been ruled out on rhetorical grounds): nowhere in the passage is there any

16. Cf. also Thrasybulus in Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.42, urging the newly restored democracy τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρῆσθαι, and Dionysius' account of Lys. 34, the strongly pro-democratic speech set right after the return of the democrats in 403, as περὶ τοῦ μὴ καταλῦσαι τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν (*Lys.* 32).

17. Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 34.3, Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.2, Diod. Sic. 14.3.2–3, 6. Cf. Ostwald, *Popular Sovereignty,* 469–80, and P. Harding, "O Androtion, You Fool," *AJAH* 3 (1978): 179–83.

18. The final sentence of B1 may indicate a further basis for civic consensus. The two sources on the ancestral constitution named by the speaker in §10, "old reports" (λόγοι οἱ παλαιότεροι) and "old citizens" (οἱ πρεσβύτεροι), each represent a different stage of the ancestral constitution and thus a different version of the Athenian past. The "old citizens" would reach back to the days of Ephialtes and Pericles, and the "old reports" would reach back further, to Cleisthenes and Solon. These famous names and stages of the past functioned as propaganda in the constitutional struggles of the late fifth century; cf. Ostwald, *Popular Sovereignty,* 369–72.

19. Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 40.3; Andoc. 1.73, 76, 106–9; Lys. 18.18, 25.20, 27; Isoc. 7.69; cf. P. Funke, *Homonoia und Arche,* Historia Einzelschriften 37 (Wiesbaden, 1980), 23–25. White does not consider ὁμόνοια in his article. On ὁμόνοια in the classical period, see J. de Romilly, "Vocabulaire et propagande ou les premiers emplois du mot ὁμόνοια," *Mélanges Chantraine,* Études et commentaires 79 (Paris, 1972), 199–209, and D. Whitehead, ed. and tr., *Aineias the Tactician: How to Survive Under Siege* (Oxford, 1990), 27–33, 126, 137.

mention or even hint of any of the matters—Chalcedon, leniency, autonomy, defection—that White claims the speech was about.

Yet much about Thrasymachus B1 necessarily remains uncertain. It would be a mistake to quibble, as did previous commentators, over whether the speech belongs in 411/410 or 404/403; both are consistent with the evidence, as is virtually any other time just before, during, or after those years. The change from peace to war and from concord to discord mentioned in §§3–4 offers no help; the time frame for this change is unspecified, as are the degree and nature of the war and discord. War and civic discord were on the minds of Athenians throughout the late fifth and early fourth centuries. For a politician intent on staking out an independent position, virtually any occasion during these decades would permit the vagueness of this statement on war and discord to serve as a useful opening.[20]

Beyond the three possibilities mentioned at the outset of this note, none of which can be ruled out on the extant evidence, it is important to bear in mind a fourth possibility that turns the very vagueness of the passage to account: B1 may never have formed part of a full speech at all, whether intended for delivery by an Athenian politician or composed as a model or pamphlet; it could well have been composed to stand on its own as a model deliberative prooemium. There is evidence that Thrasymachus composed model or instructive prooemia: Athenaeus (416A) relates an anecdote found, he says, ἔν τινι τῶν προοιμίων of Thrasymachus; these prooemia may have belonged to a work known as ἀφορμαὶ ῥητορικαί ("rhetorical resources") ascribed to Thrasymachus in the *Suda* (s.v. Θρασύμαχος). Collections of prooemia, now lost, are also attested for Critias and Antiphon.[21] But the most important argument for supposing that B1 originally stood on its own derives from its evident functionality as a model prooemium. The extant collection of προοίμια δημηγορικά composed by Demosthenes, already cited as evidence in this discussion, provides the essential comparandum.[22]

Like virtually all the prooemia in the Demosthenic collection, B1 alerts the audience to a particular problem thwarting current deliberation (civic discord in this case); and by claiming to be able to solve this problem, the speaker implicitly seeks

20. At p. 313 White infers from §§3–4 that "the situation envisioned suggests a city relatively remote from major conflict." This is a subjective impression, based on tendentious, if not implausible, identifications of the war, peace, discord, and concord mentioned in §§3–4 (pp. 313–15). Previous commentators have likewise proposed equally tendentious and plausible, if entirely different, identifications; see n. 2 above. The effort is misconceived; the vagueness is intentional. Compare the similar and equally vague statement in Lys. 25.30: [the speaker's opponents] ἀντὶ μὲν ὁμονοίας ὑποψίαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους πεποιήκασιν, ἀντὶ δὲ εἰρήνης πόλεμον κατηγγέλκασι. This offers no help in dating Lys. 25 (for which 403, the restored democracy, is the terminus post quem). On war and faction during this period, see B. S. Strauss, *Athens after the Peloponnesian War: Class, Faction and Policy 403–386 B.C.* (Ithaca, 1987).

21. On the meaning of ἀφορμαὶ ῥητορικαί, "resources" rather than "beginnings," cf. *Rhet. Alex.* 38.1, and U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, ed., *Euripides Herakles*[2] (Berlin, 1895; reprinted Darmstadt, 1959), 3.60–61. The "resources" may have contained other sorts of rhetorically useful passages attributed to Thrasymachus, for instance, those inciting pity (ἔλεοι, Arist. *Rh.* 1404a13) and overpowering ones (ὑπερβάλλοντες, Plut. *Mor.* 616d); cf. Drerup, "Anfänge," 225–27 for a summary of the evidence. On Critias, see Hermog. *Id.* 402.6 Rabe, explicitly called δημηγορικὰ προοίμια. On Antiphon, see *Suda* s.vv. αἰσθέσθαι, ἅμα, μοχθηρός, most likely judicial preambles; cf. O. Navarre, *Essai sur la rhétorique grecque avant Aristote* (Paris, 1900), 132–34.

22. On the title of the collection, see Clavaud, *Prologues*, 5; on the authenticity of the collection, see H. Yunis, *Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in Classical Athens* (Ithaca, 1996), 287–89; on the nature and function of the prooemia in the collection, see Yunis, *Taming Democracy*, 247–57. The existence of this collection escaped White's notice when he asserted that B1 "differs fundamentally from the only certain model-speeches that are extant, all of which are forensic" (p. 311).

the audience's close attention. Yet even as it envisions this specific deliberative problem, the passage conspicuously omits any references to specific people, occasions, places, etc. Such references would tie the passage to one specific occasion in the assembly, and thus restrict it to one particular speech delivered on that one occasion. The very lack of specific references allows the passage to function as a model: it could be reproduced in or adapted to any real speech in which a speaker might find it desirable to focus on civic discord. One further aspect of B1 both resembles the Demosthenic prooemia and manifests its usefulness as a model: the passage is so general and indefinite that a speaker could use it to propose virtually any specific policy in the body of the speech.[23]

If B1 was composed as a model prooemium, that would not preclude its having been delivered or adapted for delivery by a speaker in the Athenian assembly as part of a full speech. We should be wary of positing hard and fast divisions between the different uses and reuses to which a rhetorical passage may have been put in antiquity. Athenian orators reused various passages, often with adaptations, for various purposes. For instance, Demosthenes did not hesitate to reuse his own material; and Aeschines (2.172–76) adapted from Andocides (3.3–12) a folksy narrative of fifth-century Athenian history. Several prooemia in the Demosthenic collection are found verbatim or nearly so as the introductions to several of Demosthenes' full deliberative speeches. And the practice of speechwriting for the Athenian courts may have included the use of general models to be adapted by litigants for specific cases, as well as the more familiar commission of full-scale speeches composed for a litigant's particular case.[24] Thus we are in no position to postulate whether Thrasymachus B1 belonged to a full speech or was ever delivered; it may have been both, neither, or merely one or the other of these alternatives.

Though it is certain that B1 would have found its most appropriate use in the domestic debates of late fifth- and early fourth-century Athens, the usefulness of the

23. Referring to Dionysius' sole comment on the context of B1, ἐξ ἐνὸς τῶν δημηγορικῶν λόγων (*Dem.* 3), White claims that "Dionysius characterizes B1 as only an excerpt: ἐξ implies that it originally continued, and λόγων suggests a complete speech. In calling it a 'public' [i.e., demegoric] speech, in fact, he implies that it was actually delivered" (310). It may be doubted whether these are the clear implications of Dionysius' words; but that doubt aside, we may grant that Dionysius believed that B1 was an excerpt from a complete speech that was actually delivered, and yet have reason to consider him mistaken. We have no knowledge of the context from which Dionysius took the passage. As White admits (pp. 310–11, nn. 14–15), Dionysius may have found Thrasymachus B1 in a collection of excerpts, in which case Dionysius could only surmise the original context. Dionysius speaks of the political speeches in Thucydides as δημηγορικοὶ λόγοι (*Thuc.* 16, 42, 55), yet we do not for that reason believe that they were delivered. However, Dionysius uses the term δημηγορικός as a generic description, which implies nothing about delivery and suits Thrasymachus B1. Elsewhere Dionysius says that Thrasymachus "left no judicial or deliberative speeches (συμβουλευτικοὺς λόγους)" (*Is.* 20), which contradicts the assertion in *Dem.* 3 that B1 comes "from one of the demegoric speeches (δημηγορικῶν λόγων)." Various emendations of *Is.* 20 have been suggested to avoid contradiction with *Dem.* 3, but the text displays no sign of corruption. The contradiction is likely to be genuine and reflect confusion or uncertainty on the part of Dionysius about the original status of Thrasymachus' oratory.

24. On the passages and prooemia reused by Demosthenes, see Clavaud, *Prologues,* 50–55, and S. G. Daitz, "The Relationship of the *De Chersoneso* and the *Philippica Quarta* of Demosthenes," *CP* 52 (1957): 145–62, esp. 147–48. Dem. 30.37, a discussion of evidence based on torture, replicates Isae. 8.12 nearly verbatim. Cf. also Antiphon 5.87–89 = 6.5–6, 5.14 = 6.2; Aeschin. 1.4 = 3.6. On the varieties of forensic speechwriting in Athens, see K. J. Dover, *Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum* (Berkeley, 1968), 148–74. On the shifting domains of written and oral rhetoric in fourth-century Athens, see L. Canfora, *Per la cronologia di Demostene* (Bari, 1968), 9–36, and id., "Discours écrit/discours réel chez Démosthène," in *Les Savoirs de l'écriture en Grèce ancienne,* Cahiers de Philologie 14, ed. M. Detienne (Lille, 1988), 211–20. Recall too another curious reuse of rhetorical material in Athens: Plato's *Menexenus,* originally intended as literary parody, came eventually, if we can believe Cicero (*Orat.* 151), to be delivered annually in public in Athens.

passage may have extended further. One could substitute for the initial Ἀθηναῖοι the name of any other citizen body deliberating under the stress of discord and (mutatis mutandis) the passage would work as well for a speaker addressing them as it would for an Athenian rhetor addressing the Athenians. We have no reason to think that a non-Athenian Greek would not have perceived this and, given the right opportunity, have acted on it.[25]

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OVID'S TEREUS: FIRE, BIRDS, AND THE
REIFICATION OF FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE

A number of scholars have studied the relationship between narrative and metamorphosis in Ovid's *Metamorphoses,* suggesting that metamorphosis is a manifestation of some essential feature described in the narrative: the character of a person;[1] the passions that act upon a person;[2] a person's conduct;[3] or the internal changes a person experiences.[4] Thus, according to these scholars, narrative events somehow determine metamorphosis.[5] I wish to examine the ways in which figurative language determines both narrative events and metamorphosis.[6] The multiple levels of

1. G. K. Galinsky, *Ovid's Metamorphoses: An Introduction to the Basic Aspects* (Oxford, 1975), 45: "transformations often are not capricious but turn out to be very meaningful because they set in relief the true and lasting character of the person involved." See also L. B. Barkan, *The Gods Made Flesh: Metamorphosis and the Pursuit of Paganism* (New Haven, 1986), 25–26; G. B. Riddehough, "Man-Into-Beast Changes in Ovid," *Phoenix* 13 (1959): 201–3; C. P. Segal, "Philomela's Web and The Pleasures of the Text: Reader and Violence in the *Metamorphoses* of Ovid," in DeJong and Sullivan, *Modern Critical Theory and Classical Literature* (Leiden, 1994), 270; J. B. Solodow, *The World of Ovid's Metamorphoses* (Chapel Hill, 1988), 2.

2. C. P. Segal, "Myth and Philosophy in the *Metamorphoses:* Ovid's Augustanism and the Augustan Conclusion of Book 15," *AJP* 90 (1969): 266: "the passions work upon the personality of the character involved and is changed into the bestial or elemental equivalent of that passion: the cruel Lycaon into a wolf, the lustful Jupiter into a bull, the mechanically and mindlessly efficient Arachne into a spider, Tereus into a long-beaked hoopoe . . . and so on."

3. See Segal, "Philomela's Web," 268; R. A. Swanson, "Ovid's Pythagorean Essay," *CJ* 54 (1958): 23.

4. W. S. Anderson, "Multiple Change in the *Metamorphoses,*" *TAPA* 94 (1963): 18: metamorphosis "punctuates the tale" as an apt conclusion to and commemoration of the alterations experienced by characters in the narrative. See also Barkan, *Gods,* 59; Brooks Otis, *Ovid as an Epic Poet* (Cambridge, 1970), 214.

5. See also Barkan, *Gods,* 21; Hermann Fränkel, *Ovid: A Poet Between Two Worlds* (Berkeley, 1945), 97–98; Emilio Pianezzola, "La Metamorfosi ovidiana come metafora marrativa," in *Retorica e poetica, Atti del III Covegno Italo-Tedesco* (Padova, 1979), 88–89; E. A. Schmidt, *Ovids poetische Menschenwelt: Die Metamorphosen als Metapher und Symphonie* (Heidelberg, 1991), 56–69.

6. Previous studies have rarely focused upon the figurative language of the text. Barkan (*Gods,* 20), noting the lack of scholarly awareness of the relation between simile and metamorphosis, writes, "Ovid frequently uses similes as protometamorphoses, rhetorically pointing out the direction in which an individual will literally travel when transformation takes place." However, his example of Lichas, who, after having been compared to snow and hail (9.220–22) in the immediate context of transformation, becomes a rock, hardly functions as the material embodiment of narrative figures by metamorphosis for which I will argue. For more exact anticipations of metamorphosis by similes see W. S. Anderson, *Ovid's Metamorphoses: Books 6–10* (Oklahoma, 1972), on *Met.* 10.190–95 and 371–76.